Abstract-HADOF is a set of mechanisms to protect mobile ad hoc networks against routing disruption attacks launched by inside attackers. First, each node launches a rouie trafti. ohserver to monitor the behavior of each valid route in its route cache, and to collect the packet forwarding statistics submitted by the nodes on this route. Since malicious nodes may submit false reports, each node also keeps chealing records for other nodes. If a node is detected as dishonest, this node will he excluded from future routes, and the other nodes wiil stop forwarding packets for it. Third, each node will try to huildfifriendship with other nodes to speed up malicious node detection. Route diversiry will be explored by each to discover multiple routes to the destination, which can increase the chance of defeating malicious nodes who aim to prevent good routes from being discovered. In addition, adaprive route rediscovery will be applied to determine when new routes should he discovered. HADOF can handle various attacks and introduces little overhead to the existing protocols. Both analysis and simulation studies have confirmed the effectiveness of HADOF.
the dynamically changing topology may cause frequent routes update; the lack of centralized monitoring or management points further deteriorates the situations. Attackers can easily launch a variety of attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active interfering.
During the last decade, extensive studies have been conducted on routing in mobile ad hoc networks, and have resulted in several mature routing protocols [7] - [10] . However. in order to work properly. these protocols need trusted working environments which are not always available. In many situations, the environments may be adversarial. For example, some nodes may be selfish. malicious, or compromised by attackers. In the literature. many schemes have been proposed to secure ad hoc network routing protocols. However. most schemes focus on preventing attackers from entering the network through secure key distribution/authenticatinn and secure neighbor discovery, such as [51, [61, [111-[15] . These schemes are not effective in the situations where the malicious nodes have entered the network. or some nodes in the network have been compromised.
In this paper, we consider the scenario that all nodes in the network belong to the same authority and pursue common goals, and propose a set of integrated mechanisms to defend against routing disruption attacks launched by inside attackers. Under this scenario, we can categorize the nodes into two classes: good and malicious. Good nodes will try their best to forward packets for others, that is. they are fully cooperative, while malicious nodes may manipulate routing messages, (selectively) drop data packets, and frame up other good nodes, with the objective of degrading the network performance and consuming valuable network resources. We use "JL4DOF" (the acronym of Honesty, Adaptivity, Diversity, Observer. and Friendship) to refer to the set of proposed mechanisms to defend against routing disruption attacks, which in brief works in the following way. Each node launches a route rrum observer to monitor the behavior of each valid route in its route cache, and to collect the packet forwarding statistics submitted by the nodes on those routes. Since the proposed reports submission mechanism does not rely on monitoring neighbors' forwarding activities, it is much more energy efficient than the watchdog mechanism.
Since malicious nodes may submit false reports, each node also keeps a cheabing record database that indicates whether some nodes are dishonest or have been suspected as dishonest.
If a node is detected as cheating, then this node will be excluded from future routes. Furthermore, other nodes will stop forwarding packets originated from this cheating node as punishment. In many situations. if malicious nodes are smart, it is hard to find concrete evidence to prove that h e y are cheating. To address. this issue and speed up the malicious node detection. each node can also buildfriendship with other nodes that it trusts.
The next two mechanisms are to explore the rmrre diversi? and the dynamic nature of mobile ad hoc networks. Since there may exist more than one route from a source to a destination, the source can try to find multiple routes to the destination, and adaptively determine which route should be uszd. By expioring route diiwsi?, we expect that the frequency of route discovery can be reduced, and the case that malicious nodes try to prevent good routes from being discovered can be better handled. Due to node, mobility and dynamically changing traffic pattern, a route which was good before may not be necessarily good currently. Instead of waiting for all the routes in the route cache becoming invalid, adaptive route rediscover). tries to trade the route discovery overhead with the route quality through dynamically determining when new route discoveries should be initiated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I1 presents the related work. Section 111 outlines our assumptions. Section IV describes HADOF in detail. Section V analyzes the security of NADOF. Simulation methodology and performance metrics are described in Section VI. Section VI1 presents the simulation results and performance evaluation. Finally Section VIU concludes this paper.
rI. RELATED WORK
To secure the ad hoc network, the first step is to prevent attackers from entering the network through secure key distribution/authentication and secure neighbor discovery, such as IS], 161, [11]-[15] . However, these schemes cannot work well when attackers have entered the network. To defend against inside attackers, schemes based on monitoring packet forwarding activities have been shown to be promising solutions 121, PI, Papadimitratos and Haas [ l l ] proposed a secure routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that guarantees the discovery of correct connectivity information over an unknown network in the presence of malicious nodes. However, it is still vulnerable to several attacks, such as rushing attacks and wormhole. Sanzgiri et a1 [121 considered a scenario that nodes authenticate routing information coming from their neighbors while not all the nodes on the route will be authenticated by the sender and the receiver. However, this scheme cannot handle compromised nodes. Hu, Perrig and Johnson [5J proposed Ariadne, a secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol, which can prevent attackers or compromised nodes from tampering with uncompromised routes that (only) consist of uncompromised nodes. In 161, I141, they described how to defend against rushing attacks through secure neighbor discovery and how to apply packet leashes to defend against wormhole attacks. Later, Capkun and Hubaux investigated secure routing in ad hoc networks in which security associations exist only between a subsel of all pairs of nodes 1201. However, none of the above schemes can handle inside attackers well.
To defend against attackers that have entered the network and can be on discovered route, reputation system based on monitoring traffics in the network can be used. Initial work using these mechanisms is proposed by Marti et a1 [3] . In their paper, they considered the case that nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do so, and proposed two tools that can be applied upon source routing protocols: watchdog and pathrater. However, their scheme suffers many problems. First. watchdog requires the prurniscuous mode of the wireless interface which is not always available. Second, since nodes using watchdog have to keep receiving packets from their neighbors, the network capacity may be reduced and a lot of energy will be wasted. Third, the watchdog cannot distinguish malicious behavior from misbehavior caused by temporary network malfunction, such as collision or network congestion. Therefore, watchdog suffers a lot of false alarms. Fourth, the pathrater defines the route quality as the average reputation of the nodes on the route, which in general is not the best metric. Another major problem, which has also been reckoned in their paper [3] , is that their schemes are not collusion resistant, and also vulnerable to the attacks that aim to frame up innocent nodes. In [ 161, [21] . the authors extended the ideas in [3] , and allowed the reputation to propagate throughout the network. However, since they still rely on watchdog, schemes in [16] In [17]-[19] , the authors consider the scenario that nodes are selfish, and may be unwilling to forward packet on the benefits of other nodes. They proposed schemes to stimulate cooperation among nodes based on credit system or game theory. However, those schemes cannot handle malicious nodes in the network whose objective is to maximize the damage they cause to the network, instead of maximizing their own benefits obtained from the network. Two types of attacks have been widely used to attack the network layer in ad hoc networks: resoiirce consumpiion and routing disruption [5] . Resource consumption attacks refer to that the attackers inject extra packets into the network in attempt to consume valuable network resources. Routing disruption attacks, which are the focus of this paper, refer to that attackers attempt to cause legitimate data packets to be routed in dysfunctional ways, and consequently cause packets to be dropped or extra network resources to be consumed.
Some examples of routing disruption attacks are: bEuck hole, gray hole. wormhole, rushing attack, and frame-up [51, [6] , [14] , [15] . The attackers can create a wormhole through collusion in the network to short circuit the normal flow of routing packets [ 141. or can apply rushing attack.to disseminate ' KOUTE REQUEST quickly through the network [6] . By creating a wormhole or applying rushing attacks, he attackers can prevent good routes from being discovered. and increase their chance of being on discovered routes. Once an attacker is on certain route. it can create a black holc by dropping all the packets passing through it, or create a gray hole by selectively dropping some packets passing through it. If the protocols have the mechanism to track malicious behavior, an attacker can also frame up good nodes. In addition, an attacker can modify the packets passing through it, which has similar effects as dropping packets, but a little bit more severe because more network resources will be wasted when the following nodes on this route continue forwarding this corrupted packet,
D. Senwit? and Key Setup Assuiiiytions
We assume that each node has a publiclprivate key pair, and there is a tight coupling between a node's public key and its address, such as deriving the IP address of the node from its public key using the methods described in 1241, 12.51. We also assume that a node can know or authenticate other nodes' public keys, but no node will disclose its private key to others unless it has been compromised. We do not assume that nodes trust each other, since some nodes may be malicious or be compromised. But if there exists some trust relationship, we will take advantage of it.
We assume that all the nodes in the network are legitimate, that is, they have been authorized to enter the network, and have certified public keys. Attackers without certified public keys can be excluded from the routes through necessary key authentication. We assume that if two nodes set up communication between them, they must have built a trust relationship, and they trust the information reported by each other. This trustiness can be built outside of the context of the network (e.g. friends), or through certain authentication mechanisms after the network has been set up.
To keep the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted content, the sources encrypt and sign each packet sent by them. Since the source and the destination trust each other, they can create a temporarily shared secret key to encrypt the communication and use an efficient hash chain to authenticate the communication I261. For each intermediate node on the route, authentication is activated only when the destination has detected abnormal corruptions in data packets, which means that some malicious nodes are on the route.
IV. DESCRlPTIONS OF HADOF
Before describing the detail of E-IADOF, we first introduce some notations listed in Table 1 . In this paper, we use S to denote the source and use D to denote the destination. Also, traffic pair refers to a pair of nodes (S, D) communicating with each other directly or indirectly. Based on our assumption, S and D lrust each other.
A. Route Trafic Observer
Each node launches a route traffic observer (RTO) to periodically collect the traffic statistics of each valid route and each route Ri to D in S's route cache that has been used in this interval. In particular, the RTO collects RN,,, (A, S, Ri) and FN,,, (A, S, &) reported by each node A on this route. This can be done by letting D periodically send back an agent packet to coliect such information, or letting each node periodically report its own statistics to S. For each node A known by S, S's RTO also keeps a record of RN,,,(A, S ) and FNtot(A; S). To reduce overhead, the RTO of S will request reports from the intermediate nodes of a route only when S realizes that some packets have been dropped on this route in this interval based on the reports submitted by D.
After the RTO has finish4 collecting packet forwarding statistics, it recalculates the expected quality of those routes that have been used in this interval. In general, route quality is affected hy many factors, such as the forwarding history of each node on this route, the hop number, the current traffic load and traffic distributions, etc. Before defining the expected route quality metric, we first define the expected packet delivery ratio of A for S, P(A, S), as follows:
That is, P(A: S) is a weighted average of P,,,(A, S, Ri) and P,,,(A, S), and p is used to adjust the weight between them.
The intuition behind this is that when predicting a node's future performance, we consider not onIy this node's current performance, but also its past history. It is easy to see that the range of P ( A , S) is between 0 and 1. In HADOF, the expected route quality Q ( & ) for route R, is calculated as follows: is trusted by S (e.g., that node is S itself or D), then the other node can be marked as cheating by S , and the honesty score of the cheating node will be set to be 0. Otherwise, S can only suspect that at least one of them is cheating, In this case, the honesty scores of both nodes are updated as
where 0 < CL: < 1 is used to indicate the punishment degree. Once a node has been detected as Cheating, punishment should be applied on it. In HADOF, when S detects a node B being malicious, S will put B in its blacklist (equivalent to set H(B, S) to be 0), stop forwarding any packets originated from B, and refuse to be on the same route as 3 in the future. Next we introduce a mechanism to recover the honesty scores of nodes that have been framed up by malicious nodes.
We still use the example in Fig. 1 
H ( A , S ) = aH(A, S)

H ( B , S ) = a H ( B , S )
the number of possible frame-up attacks launched by B to A. and records the difference between Fhrc,, (A.S,R) and RN,,,(B,S,R) . Similarly, S does the same thing to B. If later S detects that I3 is a cheating node. S will check how many nodes have ever been framed up by B and for each node how many times. Assume A has been framed up by B m times, S will recover A's honesty score as follows: which is always bounded by 1. Meanwhile, S also needs to increase FiV,,,jA, 5') or decrease RATtot(A, S j to recover the inaccuracy caused by frame-up attacks launched by B.
C. Friendship
Since a malicious node knows the source and destination of each route that it is on, to avoid being detected, it will only frame up its neighbors who are neither the source nor the destination. Therefore, even when the CR database has been activated, the malicious nodes,can only be suspected, but cannot be proved as cheating by the source. This can be mitigated by taking advantage of the existing trustiness relationship. Each node maintains a private list of trust nodes that it considers to be honest. Now if I3 submits false reports to S to frames up A, while S trusts A, B can be detected by S immediately, and H ( B , S) will be set to be 0.
D. Rouie Diversiiy
Since there may.exist more than one route from a source to a destination, it is usually beneficial to discover multiple routes. In [271, [281, the authors have shown that using multiple routes can reduce the route discovery frequency.
In this paper, we investigate how route diversity can be used to defend against routing disruption attacks. In DSR, discovering multiple routes from a source to a destination is straight-forward. Let MazRoutelVum be the maximum number of ROUTE REPLYs that the destination can send back for the route requests with the same request ID. By varying MaxRouteNum, we can discover different number of routes. By exploring route diversity, we have better chance to defeat attackers who aim to prevent good routes from being found. Meanwhile, since there may exist multiple routes, the source can always use the route with the best quality according to certain criteria.
When a new route R is discovered, for each node A on this route, FN,,,(A, S, R) and RNcur(A, S, R ) should be initialized to be 0. Since this route has never been used before, its expected quality can be calculated as
The difference between (6) and (2) the quality of a route may degrade dramatically after being injected into a lot of traffics. In this paper, the following procedure i s used to distribute traffics among multiple routes, and adaptively determine which route should be used. Lei Qthresho[d be a pre-determined quality threshold. and let RI, . . . , RK be the K routes with the expected quality higher than Q t h r e s h o l d . Once S wants to send a packet to D, S randomly picks a route among them. The probability that route R, (1 5 i 5 K ) will be picked is determined as If no route has expected quality higher than Qthresholdt the route with the highest expected quality will be selected.
E. Adaptive Roiite Rediscovery
Due to mobility and the dynamically changing traffic patterns, some routes may become invalid after a while, or their quality may change. Usually, a new route discovery should be initiated by S when there exist no available routes from S to D. In this paper, we use an adaptive route rediscovery mechanism to determine when a new route discovery should 
E Iniplernentation of HADOF
We have implemented HADOF upon DSR, which includes two major procedures: packet sending procedure and traffic statistics and cheating records updating procedure. The packet sending procedure is described in Fig. 2 . When S wants to send a packet to D, S first checks its route cache to find whether there exist valid routes to D. If there exist no valid routes. S initiates a new route discovery with the destination k i n g D. If there exist some valid routes, but none has expected quality higher than Qthreshoid, S picks the route with the best expected quality, and initiates a new route discovery. Otherwise, S randomly picks one route according to the procedure described in Section IV-D. The procedure for updatinglmaintaining traffic statistics and cheating records is described in Fig. 3 . The source S periodically calls this procedure to collect traffic statistics for each route that has been used in this interval. Based on the mechanisms described in Section IV-A and Section IV-B, S updates the expected route quality and cheating records. If necessary, a new route discovery should be initiated when certain conditions are satisfied, as described in Section IV-E. FN,,,(B, S! R) . Second, B can only make S suspect C , but cannot make S believe that C is malicious. Third. if C is trusted by S , then B can be detected immediately, and will be excluded from any route originated from S in the future. Fourth, B's own honesty score will be decreased. Therefore, B can cause only limited damage by framing up others, but has to take the risk of being detected as malicious, especially when friendship has been introduced.
Frame-up Attacks with Collusion: Next we show that collusion in frame-up attacks cannot further deteriorate the situation. We still use the route "SABCD" as an example.
In the first case, the malicious nodes are neighbors of each other. For example, B and C . Without loss of generality, we can view them as one node B', with Rhrcul-(B',S,R) = RN,,,(B, S, R) and FN,,,(B', S, R) = F I V~~, ( C , S, R).
That is, B and C together have the same effects as B' working alone, and the only difference is that h e y can release one node by sacrificing of the other one, that is, by letting it take all the responsibilities. In the second case, the malicious nodes are not neighbors of each other. For example, A and C are malicious and work together to frame up B. It can be seen that the effect of A and C jointly framing up B is the same as that of A and C framing up B independently. Thus we conclude that in HADOF collusion cannot further improve the capability of frame-up attacks. Rushing Attacks: In rushing attach, an attacker can increase its chance of being on the route by disseminating ROUTE REQUESTS quickly and suppressing any later legit-
. For example, in Fig. 4 , if V can broadcast the ROUTE REQUESTS originated from S more quickly than A and E, then all the ROUTE REQUESTS broadcasted by A and E will be ignored. The direct consequence is that V appears on all the routes returned by D. Later V can drop packets and frame up its neighbors. Now we show how rushing attacks can be handled using HADOF. If S detects that no routes to D in its route cache work well, it will check whether these routes share a critical node where all packets from S to D pass through it. In this example, the critical node is V. If V has IOW Pavs(V, S) value and low H ( V , S), S has reasons to suspect that V has launched rushing attacks. S then initiates a new route discovery and explicitly exclude V from being an discovered routes.
Wormhole Attacks: A pair of attackers can create a wormhole in the network via a private network connection to disrupt routing by short circuiting the normal flow of routing packets [14] . For example, in Fig. 4 In summary, WADOF can handle various routing disruption attacks very well, such as gray hole, black hole. frame-up, and rushing attacks, and wormhole attacks, and is collusionresistant.
VI. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY A. Simulator and Simulation Parameters
In our simulations, we use an event-driven simulator to simulate mobile ad hoc networks. The physical layer assumes a fixed transmission range model, where two nodes can directly communicate with each other successfully only if they are in each other's transmission range. The MAC layer protocol simulates the EEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) [29] . DSR is used as the underlying routing protocol. The simulation parameters are listed in Table E . We use a rectanguIar space of size IOOOm x 1000m. The total number of nodes is 100, and the maximum transmission range is 250m. There are 20 traffic pairs randomly generated for each simulation. For each traffic pair, the packet arrival is modelled as a Poisson process, and the average packet inter-arrival time is uniformly chosen between 0.04 and 0.2 second, such that each traffic pair injects different traffic load to the network, which we expect could better simulate the reality than using the same inter-anival time far all the traffic pairs. The size of each data packet after encryption is 512 bytes, and the link bandwidth is 1 Mbps. Among the 100 nodes, we vary the total number of malicious nodes from 5 to 20. In our implementation, the malicious nodes will submit false reports only when it has dropped packets and this false reports cannot be detected easily. For example. a malicious node will not submit false reports to frame up the sources or the destinations.
In the simulations, each node moves randomly according to a random waypaint model [22] : a node starts at a random position, waits for a duration called the pause rime that is modeled as a random variable with exponential distribution, then randomly chooses a new location and moves towards the new location with a velocity uniformly chosen between 0 and w,,,,. When it arrives at the new location, it waits for another random pause time and repeats the process. In the simulations, 
B. Bnseline and Watchdog
In our simulations, the baseline system is implemented as follows: the basic DSR described in Section 111-B is used, and for each route discovery, only one route is returned. No adaptive route rediscovery is used, and no malicious node detection mechanisms are applied. It is expected that the baseline system will perform badly in most situations.
For comparison, the mechanism proposed in [3] has also been implemented, which includes two major components: watchdog and pathrater. To make watchdog work properly, we have modified the MAC layer protocol to ensure the following property: after node B receives a packet from node A and needs to forward this packet to node C, B can start the forwarding only if both A and C are idle and ready to receive packets. When using watchdog, a node will report to the source when another node refuses to forward more than certain number of packets for it. In our implementation, we set the threshold to be 5. In addition, each route discovery initiated by source S will return at most 5 routes, and the route with the best quality (calculated using pathrater) will be used. When the route in use becomes invalid due to link breaks, instead of using the routes in S's Route Cache, S will initiate a new route discovery. The reason is that with a very high probability those routes may also not work or may work badly due to mobility and traffic dynamics. The SSR [Send extra Route Request) extension has also been implemented. The following metrics will be used to evaluate the perforPacket drop ratio: The percentage of data packets that have been sent by not been received by the destinations, which equals to 1 minus end-to-end throughput. Overhead: In this paper, we consider routing overhead, energy consumption overhead, e n c y t i o n overhead, and CompIexity overhead accounts for the extra storage and computations needed by applying these mechanisms.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We use "baseline" to denote the baseline system. "watchdog" to denote the system based on watchdog and pathrater, and "HADOF' to denote the system based on HADOE We use different node movement patterns for each simulation by changing the average pause time and the seed of random number generator. By varying the number of malicious nodes and the average pause time, we get different configurations.
For each configuration, the results are averaged over 25 rounds of simulations, where at each round we change the random seed to get different movement and traffic patterns. To make fair comparison, for each configuration and each round of simulation, the same movement and traffic patterns were used by all the three systems.
A. Packet Drop Ratio Comparisons
We compare the packet drop ratios of the three systems under different scenarios. First, we compare the packet drop ratios under only gray hole attacks. That is, no nodes will submit false reports. Second, we compare the packet drop ratios under both gray hole and frame-up attacks, where some malicious nodes will drop packets and frame up their neighbors when possible. Third, we show how friendship mechanism can mitigate the effects of frame-up attacks. 20 malicious nodes, the packet drop ratio of baseline is more than 40%, watchdog can reduce the packet drop ratio to 22%, while for HADOF, the packet drop ratio is only 16%, that is, more than 33% improvement is obtained over watchdog under this configuration. Under the configuration of pause time 50 seconds, 5 malicious nodes, more than 55% improvement is obtained over watchdog by HADOF.
2) Gray hole plus frame-up uttacks: We investigate the packet drop ratio under both gray hole and frame-up attacks.
In HADOF, the only way for a malicious node to frame up a good node is to let the source sicspect that the good node is cheating. To achieve &his, a malicious node can report a smalIer RN number than the actual value to frame up the node ahead of it on the route, andlor report a larger FN number than the actual value to frame up the node just following it on the route. However, the malicious node can never make the source believe that a good node is cheating, since malicious node cannot create solid evidence. In watchdog, there exist a variety of ways for a malicious node to frame up good ones. For example, if node A has sent a packet to B and asks B to forward it to C , B has many ways to make A believe that it has sent the packet to C while B did not send packets or intentionally caused transmission failure. As reckoned in [3] , many reasons can cause a misbehaving node not being detected, such as ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, limited transmission power, false misbehavior, collusion, and partial dropping. In our simulations. we only implement the frame-up attacks through receiver collisions.
That is, B will forward packet to C only when it knows that C cannot correctly receive it (e.g., C is transmitting data to another node, or receiving data from another node). Since A can only tell whether B has sent the packet to C, but cannot tell whether C has received it successfully. B can easily frame up its neighbors. Fig. 6 shows the simulation results with the configurations of 20 malicious nodes, half of them applying frame-up attacks.
First we can see that the degradation of HADOF caused by frame-up attacks is limited. Second, we see that frame-up degrades the performance of both, and affects watchdog more than HADOF. Meanwhile, it is important to point out that we have shown the best-case results for watchdog because we have made many assumptions which favor watchdog, such as DO collusion attacks, only receiver collisions, perfect MAC protocol. For HADOF, no extra assumptions are needed except for those listed in Section III.
3) Eflectiveness of Friendship: In the previous simulations, friendship has not been introduced and the source only tusts the destination. Next we show the results after introducing friendship mechanism to combat frame-up attacks. We conduct simulations under the situations that each source has 20 friends which are randomly chosen among all good nodes in the network. Fig. 7 shows the simulation results using HADOF with the configuration of average pause time 50 seconds, 20 malicious nodes. half of them launching both gray hole and frame-up attacks, and half of them only launching gray hole attacks. From these results we can see that the effects of frame-up attacks can be overcome when trustiness has been established among certain number of users. For example, with 20 friends, the packet drop ratio, which is 15%, is even lower than the situation that no frame-up attacks are launched, which is 16%. results we can see that though HADOF needs to initiate route discoveries preventively. it still has the lowest routing discovery overhead. In the baseline system, only one route is returned for each route discovery. which explains why baseline needs to initiate more route discoveries. This also verifies the effectiveness of path diversity. Surprisingly, watchdog has the highest route discovery overhead, which comes from its high false alarm ratio, since a new route discovery will be initiated once no route has average reputation larger than 0.
Energy Consumption Overhead: One major drawback of watchdog is that it consumes much more energy than HADOF, because each node has to keep monitoring its neighbors' transmission activities We use Fig. 1 to illustrate why watchdog needs to consume extra energy. For example, after B sends a packet to C and asks C to forward the packet to D. B has to keep listening C's transmission. If C is a malicious node, C can launch resource consumption attacks to consume B's energy by putting off forwarding packets for B. Even if C is a g o d node, B still needs to consume extra energy to receive, decode, and compare the packets transmitted by C with the packets stored in B's buffer. This consumes a lot of extra energy. By requiring nodes to keep monitoring their neighbors, watchdog not only reduces network capacity, but also consumes extra energy. On the other hand, HADOF has no such drawbacks, Encryption Overhead: As we discussed in Section In, all packets should be encrypted and signed to ensure data confidentiality and integrity. Otherwise, outside attackers can easily intercept those messages through eavesdropping. Compared with the baseline system, HADOF introduces some encryption overhead which comes from encrypting the reports. In most situations only the destination needs to submit reports, and the source and the destination already share a secrete key for data encryption. Thus, the reports from the desmation can just be encrypted by this secrete key, which introduces little overhead. In addition, if the amount of data for reporting packet forwarding statistics is much less than the amount of data, which is generally true, the overhead of encrypting reports of intermediate nodes on the route will become negligible compared with data encryption overhead.
Complexity Overhead: In HADOF. each source needs to launch a route traffic observer to maintain and update traffic statistics. and maintain records to keep track of cheating behavior. However, both can be implemented using simple data structures, and consume M e memory. The computation overhead comes from updaung traffic statistics, route quality, and cheating records. These operations will not introduce much computation burden. In watchdog, each node also needs to keep a reputation database and need to calculate route quality. Moreover, each node in warchdog needs to keep an extra buffer to store the packets that it has requested its neighbors to forward but have not been confirmed, which consumes a lot of extra memory, and may introduce extra computation overhead to compare the packets.
VUI. CONCLUSION
Mobile ad hoc networks have attracted a lot of attentions from military, industry, and academy. However, before mobile ad hoc networks can be successfully deployed, the security issues have to be resolved first. In this paper we proposed HADOF to defend against routing disruption attacks launched by inside attackers, which can be implemented upon the existing source routing protocols. HADOF is capable of adaptively adjusting routing strategies according to the network dynamics and nodes' past records and current performance. It can handel various attacks launched by malicious nodes, such as black hole, gray hole, frame-up. rushing attacks, and wormhole attacks. Moveover, HADOF introduces little overhead to the existing routing protocols, and is fully distributed.
Extensive simulation studies have also confirmed the effectiveness of HADOF. For example, in the presence of 20 malicious nodes with each launching a gray hole attack by selectively dropping half of the packets passing through it, and with half of them also launching frame-up attacks, the system without protection schemes has 40% packet drop ratio, the system using watchdog and pathrater can reduce the packet drop ratio to at most 26%, while the system using HADOF can reduce the packet drop ratio to only 15%. The simulation results have also shown that HADOF introduces little routing discovery, encryption and complexity overhead.
